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A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
EXAS courts addressed a wide array of sales tax issues during the
survey period. Sharp v. Park 'N Fly of Texas, Inc.I involved a tax-
payer who provided airport parking and shuttle transportation
services. The comptroller assessed a tax on the entire charge as a taxable
parking service. The taxpayer argued it was providing two services, one
taxable and the other nontaxable. The district court held in favor of the
taxpayer,2 finding Rule 3.3153 invalid because it unlawfully imposed sales
tax on nontaxable transportation services, and finding that the comptrol-
ler's taxation of the taxpayer's transportation services violated the tax-
payer's rights to equal protection and to equal and uniform taxation
under the United States and Texas Constitutions by failing to tax other,
similar transportation services.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision and found that
the sales price of a taxable service is the total amount for which the ser-
vice is sold, without a deduction for transportation incident to the per-
formance of the service.4 The court held that because the shuttle service
occurred with, and was related to, the parking service, the shuttle service
was "incident to" the parking service and thus included in the taxable
sales price.5 The court distinguished taxation of other transportation ser-
vice providers, such as taxis, limousines, and hotel shuttles, on the basis
that such services were not related to parking services and were generally
operated on a stand-alone basis. The court also found that the comptrol-
ler's adoption in 1989 of its policy of taxing transportation services pro-
vided incident to motor vehicle parking services and the enactment in
1995 of a clarifying rule amendment to reflect such policy was not uncon-
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist
University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 969 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
2. See No. 95-12285 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Apr. 11, 1997) (discussed in
Cynthia M. Ohlenforst, Dorrill, & Goodin, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51 SMU
L. REv. 1345, 1347 (1998) [hereinafter Ohlenforst, 1998 Annual Survey].
3. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.315 (1998).
4. See 969 S.W.2d at 573, 575.




Grocers Supply Co. v. Sharp7 is a significant case because it illustrates a
judicial willingness, given particular facts, to allow the comptroller to
change a prior interpretation of law on a retroactive basis. The taxpayer
in this case challenged the comptroller's policy change regarding the prior
contract exception that exempts from an increase in the tax rate or enact-
ment of a new tax those contracts executed prior to such rate change or
new tax. In Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co.,8 the Texas
Supreme Court determined the prior contract exemption was intended to
apply only to three-party contracts, not to contracts between a buyer and
seller when no third party was affected. However, in 1984, the comptrol-
ler began granting prior contract exemptions for two-party contracts. The
taxpayer in Grocers Supply sought a refund relating to its electricity con-
tract with Houston Lighting and Power Company under which sales tax
was paid at the rate in effect at the time of payment. In May 1992, the
comptroller changed his policy and decided to interpret the prior contract
exemption as limited to two-party contracts, based on Calvert.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the comptroller had made no
public announcement of the policy change and had retroactively applied
the change in policy to pending refund claims. The taxpayer argued that
the comptroller's retroactive enforcement of the policy change violated
the comptroller's rule on prior contracts, contravened legislative intent,
constituted an unlawful retroactive application of applicable law, and vio-
lated constitutional equal protection rights.9 The court determined that
the policy allowing prior contract exemption to two-party contracts was
found in the comments to the rule and was not actually found in the lan-
guage of the rule itself. Therefore, the comptroller's change in policy did
not violate the rule-only his interpretation of the rule. Further, the
court determined that the comptroller's policy did not create a vested
right; thus, the policy change during the pendency of the refund claim was
not an unconstitutional retroactive application of law. Although noting
that the comptroller's "actions do not foster the confidence and certainty
in government upon which the people of this State are entitled to rely,"
the court found no violation of the doctrine of legislative acceptance and
no constitutional violation of the right to equal taxation.10
The court in Sharp v. Clearview Cable TV, Inc.1 determined that a
cable company could purchase certain equipment tax free that was trans-
ferred to its customers for use in providing a taxable service. The case is
significant for its recognition that traditional concepts concerning what
constitutes a "resale" for sales tax purposes are difficult to apply to cer-
6. See id. at 578. Note that the 1995 rule amendment stated that it had a 1993 effec-
tive date.
7. 978 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
8. 397 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1965).
9. See 978 S.W.2d at 641.
10. Id. at 645.
11. 960 S.W.2d 424. (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
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tain service transactions. As part of the cable service, the taxpayer
purchases and installs equipment on the customer's premises. The comp-
troller asserted that the resale exemption was not applicable on the
ground that the taxpayer did not transfer to the customer the care and
control of the equipment installed outside the customer's premises (the
antenna, converter, and connecting wire). The court acknowledged that
the taxpayer was transferring only possession of the equipment and that
both the taxpayer and the customer would have some degree of joint care
and control over the property. According to the court, the comptroller's
interpretation, which would require a complete divestiture of all rights in
the property, would be unreasonable. The court based its holding that
the sale for resale exemption is applicable on its conclusion that the cus-
tomer had the primary possession of the equipment at issue.
Another services case, Associated Technics, et al. v. Sharp,12 focuses on
whether the asbestos abatement services performed by the taxpayers,
constitute taxable repair and remodeling or nontaxable removal of haz-
ardous waste. In a short letter ruling, the district court judge correctly
concluded that the services at issue were not repair and remodeling and
therefore were not taxable. The comptroller, however, consistent with his
position in the underlying administrative cases, asserted that asbestos
abatement involves two distinct services: extrication and disposal, and
that the extrication is taxable as real property repair and remodeling.
Under this line of analysis, it appears that the comptroller's interpretation
would virtually always be at odds with the legislative intent that tax not
be imposed on the removal of hazardous waste. The comptroller filed an
appellate brief in this case on September 25, 1998.13
During every survey period, hundreds of comptroller decisions address
sales tax issues. The availability of the occasional sale exemption is again
an issue in many of these cases. In Decision 36,047,14 the comptroller
again addressed the requirements for an occasional sale in the context of
a company that sold most, but not all, of its assets. In October of 1994,
the taxpayer sold eighty-nine pieces of construction equipment (including
several motor vehicles) to another company. The taxpayer did not sell
three motor vehicles that were used both in its general business and for
personal use by its officers. Moreover (and more troubling for the tax-
payer), there were seventy-four additional items that taxpayer had owned
prior to the sale. The evidence showed that some of these items had been
abandoned prior to sale and that some were listed as having been sold to
the purchaser, although the purchaser did not allocate any part of the
purchase price to those items.
Section 151.30415 exempts from sales taxes the occasional tax of a taxa-
12. No. 96-04152 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Mar. 12, 1998).
13. Another case addressing asbestos abatement is Americo Abatement Contractors v.
Sharp, pending in Travis County District Court; this case focuses on whether certain items
purchased by an asbestos abatement provider are taxable.
14. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,047 (July 14, 1998).
15. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(a) (Vernon 1992).
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ble item. Subsection (b)(2) defines one type of occasional sale as "the
sale of entire operating assets of a business or of a separate division,
branch or identifiable segment of a business." 16 The tax division relied
on the fact that subsection (d)(3) defines operating assets for purposes of
"this section" to conclude that the definition of operating assets applies
only when the sale of the assets is of a segment of a business. However,
the administrative law judge's decision points out that, when the rule was
revised in 1994 to refer to what had been section (d) as "subsection" (d),
the revised rule made clear that the definition of operating assets applies
not only to transactions that involve the sale of a separate division or
branch, but also to the sale of the entire business. Because the three ve-
hicles that were not sold to the company had not been used "exclusively"
by the business being sold, the taxpayer could hold those assets out of the
sale and still qualify for the occasional sale exemption.
The taxpayer in Decision 36,047 also asserted that, in another context
(concerning successor liability), Texas had interpreted "all" to mean
"substantially all" or at least eighty percent,' 7 so that a sale of eighty
percent of its assets was sufficient to constitute a sale of "all" of its oper-
ating assets. The comptroller's decision held, however, that the "substan-
tially all" language applies only to the occasional sale exemptions
described in subsection (e)(3) (i.e., transfers without change in owner-
ship) and does not apply to the sale of assets.18 Similarly, the taxpayer
failed to prevail with its argument that it had withheld from sale only a
"de minimus" number of assets.
However, the taxpayer ultimately prevailed because it demonstrated
that the other assets at issue had actually been sold to the purchaser, even
though they were not taken into account in the price allocation. This
evidence, therefore, established that the taxpayer had sold its entire oper-
ating assets. 19
As technology continues to advance, a multitude of comptroller deci-
sions and taxability response letters evidence the difficult challenge ap-
plying Texas sales and use tax laws to a rapidly changing world.
Numerous recent comptroller decisions and letters, for example, interpret
the taxation of various internet services.20 These interpretations are im-
portant to note because they reflect the continuing difficulty of defining
accurately the scope and taxability of internet-related services. The Texas
Internet Tax Policy Working Group met at the comptroller's offices once
a month throughout virtually the entire survey period to focus on the
16. Id. § 151.304(b)(2).
17. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(e)(3) (1998) (concerning occasional sale exemp-
tion requirements).
18. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,047.
19. The decision also addresses certain other occasional sale issues, confirming that a
taxpayer that holds a sales tax permit may not make an occasional sale consisting of "one
or two sales of taxable items" during a twelve-month period.
20. See e.g., Ltr. 9811967L (Nov. 5, 1998) (internet access is a taxable information
service); Ltr. 9612155L (Dec. 11, 1996) (providing internet server space is data processing);
Ltr. 9512L1386B04 (Dec. 21, 1995) (creation of web page is taxable data processing).
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many policy issues underlying taxation of the internet, including review-
ing comptroller policy and interpretation.
The Working Group, which included both comptroller and non-comp-
troller representatives, ultimately concluded that, to encourage business
growth in Texas and to avoid the administrative quagmire of attempting
to distinguish internet-related services from other data processing and in-
formation services, the Texas Legislature should repeal both the sales tax
on data processing and the tax on information services. 21 The comptrol-
ler has faced an increasing number of cases involving sales or use tax on
telecommunications in recent years. One of several recent cases is Deci-
sion 32,318,22 which focused on private line services. The administrative
law judge reviewed both the statutory and regulatory history concerning
telecommunications services (both of which illustrate that lawmakers
were focusing on telephone-type services when they enacted the sales tax
on telecommunications) and concluded that private line services are taxa-
ble telecommunication services, regardless of whether the tax division has
shown that there is an actual transmission conveyance or routing. The
Decision, therefore, concludes that "merely making the private lines
available for the use of its customers, for consideration, constitutes, in
and of itself, the provision of taxable telecommunications services. '23
Another telecommunications case, Decision 31,335,24 presented a fact
pattern that, in many respects, has become more frequent in the telecom-
munications age. A taxpayer acquires long-distance services from an-
other company and makes those services available, along with services of
its own, to a customer. In this case, the taxpayer's profit came from the
differential between the rates charged to its customers and the volume
discount rates at which it was able to buy telecommunication services,
plus (for some of the audit period) an additional fixed management ser-
vice fee. The tax division initially took the position that both the "volume
based management fee" and the "fixed management services charge"
were taxable as telecommunication services. However, after the hearing,
and taking into account the fact that the invoices had a separate entry for
the fixed management fees as "Management Services," the tax division
agreed that those fees were not taxable.
Although the taxpayer took the position that it was not selling telecom-
munication services at all, the administrative law judge concluded that the
taxpayer purchased long-distance services from other companies and
then resold them to its clients, so that the taxpayer was indeed in the
business of "reselling telecommunication services. '25 The administrative
21. See REPORT OF TEXAS INTERNET TAX POLICY WORKING GROUP 13 (Jan. 1999).
The Working Group also recommended legislative changes to ensure, among other issues,
that the mere storage of software on a server in Texas would not create nexus for the
software user.
22. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,318 (Dec. 17, 1997).
23. Id.




law judge also declined to adopt the taxpayer's argument that its manage-
ment services were the "essence of the transaction" so that the transac-
tion was not taxable. (The Decision, in fact, includes an interesting
discussion of whether, in the comptroller's view, the "essence of the
transaction" test applies to mixed services transactions.) However, the
administrative law judge concluded that the taxpayer was actually selling
two services: taxable telecommunications and nontaxable management
services. 26
The tax division argued that the entire amount charged by the taxpayer
was subject to tax on the ground that the two services were provided for a
lump sum amount. Moreover, the tax division argued that the sales tax
services rules, which include the "five percent provisions" that allow
either the service provider or the purchaser to later establish, through
documentary evidence (including internal records), what portion of a
lump sum charge is attributable to the performance of both taxable and
nontaxable services, should not be available to the taxpayer. 27 The tax
division based this assertion on the fact that Rule 3.34428 does not specifi-
cally include this language, although the language appears in the rules on
data processing, security services, information services, and certain other
services. The judge, however, correctly concluded that there appears to
be "no rational basis" for allowing some taxpayers who provide mixed
services (i.e., a taxable service and a nontaxable service) to be treated
differently, and that if taxpayers who provide mixed services that do not
involve telecommunications are entitled to show what portion of their
services are taxable, the providers of telecommunications services should
be allowed to do the same. 29
Another case that addresses the scope of "telecommunications serv-
ices" is Decision 35,703. 30 The taxpayer in this case provided food com-
modity market information to its customers through various forms of
media, including telephone, fax and radio frequency transmissions. The
taxpayer contended that its services were not taxable information serv-
ices, but were telecommunications. This is an understandable argument
given how broadly the comptroller has construed "telecommunications."
If characterized as telecommunications, the services would have been
treated as New Jersey services, rather than Texas, services. However, the
comptroller concluded that the taxpayer was providing information
services. 31
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330(d)(2) (1998) (noting that if nontaxable
unrelated services and taxable services are sold for a single charge, and the taxable por-
tions more than five percent of the total, "the total charge is presumed to be taxable,"
although the buyer or seller may later establish the actual percentage that is for nontaxable
services).
28. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.344 (1998) (dealing with telecommunications).
29. See id.




More food for thought? In Decision 34,216,32 a taxpayer successfully
challenged the sampling methodology used to determine its sales tax lia-
bility. The taxpayer, which operated gas stations with convenience stores,
also made food stamp sales. The comptroller agreed that the taxable
sales base should not include the food stamp purchases. However, as part
of its sampling methodology, the auditor did not allow the reduction in
taxable sales attributable to food stamps to the extent that the reduction
exceeded zeroing out the additional taxable sales the auditor proposed
adding to that particular period. Thus, the taxpayer's credit for food
stamp sales was not allowed on an aggregate basis against total additional
taxable sales added by the audit-only on a monthly basis and only to the
extent the reduction did not exceed a zeroing out of additional sales.
Taxpayers who have been frustrated during the administrative hearing
process will love this case, if for no other reason than because the admin-
istrative law judge noted: "The Tax Division has offered no real rationale
for not carrying over credits for food stamp purchases from one tax pe-
riod to another stating only that: 'This is not allowed.' 33 The administra-
tive law judge correctly concluded that the result of the tax division's
methodology was to deny the taxpayer the exemption to which it was
entitled and therefore the audit should be amended to allow credits for
exempt food stamp sales to be carried over from one monthly audit pe-
riod to another.34
The oil and gas company that was the taxpayer in Decision 35,89935
purchased and used a weekly information service. Although the taxpayer
had oil and gas exploration and production operations in New Mexico,
those operations were overseen by the Midland Odessa office during the
audit period. The decision focuses both on what constitutes information
service as well as on what constitutes multi-state use. The taxpayer ar-
gued that the tax assessed for the information services should be allo-
cated to the identifiable segments of its business offshore or in other
states, including New Mexico. The tax division argued, on the other
hand, that the information services were used at the division headquar-
ters in Midland. The administrative law judge accepted the tax division's
analysis (perhaps over-simplified) that the decision-making as to explora-
tion and production must occur in the Texas offices so the services must
be used in those offices. 36
Although the facts of this particular case may have supported this con-
clusion, it is worth noting that, on a troubling number of occasions, the
comptroller's auditors have asserted that data processing and/or informa-
32. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,216 (July 13, 1998).
33. Id. After the survey period, legal counsel on the comptroller's staff commented
that hearings attorneys must include both rationale and legal authority to support tax divi-
sion assertions. Although many tax division attorneys already do so, the more official em-
phasis on rationale and legal authority should make good briefing more frequent.
34. See id.




tion services must necessarily be used at a company's headquarters rather
than at the location of its outlying offices, notwithstanding the contrary
legislative intent and regulatory interpretation concerning sourcing serv-
ices. Fortunately, taxpayers who are able to present evidence showing
that the benefit of the services occurs in other states are often able to
prevail.
Another case focusing on determining where the benefit of services
occurs is Decision 36,649.37 The taxpayer in this case, like the state in
Decision 35,899,38 argued that the security services performed for certain
clients are presumed to be used at the client's principal place of business.
The taxpayer based its contention on its determination that its client's
Texas offices were not "identifiable segments" of the client's business
within the meaning of Rule 3.333(o)(2). 39 The taxpayer is an insurance
claims investigation agency based in Illinois, and the services at issue in-
volved clients that requested service in a Texas office; however, the object
of the surveillance was located out of state. On this fact pattern, the tax-
payer argued that a service that cannot be assigned to an "identifiable
segment" of a customer's business is generally presumed to be used to
support the administration or operation of the customer's business gener-
ally. In this case, the taxpayer argued, the security service is presumed to
be used at the customer's principal place of business.
The taxpayer also asserted that because the term "identifiable seg-
ment" is not defined in the regulations dealing with services, it should be
interpreted as defined in the occasional sale rule. (Rule 3.316(d) 40 pro-
vides guidance as to the meaning of "identifiable segment" in the context
of determining what constitutes a sale of the operating assets of an "iden-
tifiable segment" of business.) However, the administrative law judge de-
clined to accept the taxpayer's logic "regardless of its allure," and
concluded instead that the determination of whether a separate identifi-
able segment of the business exists "turns on the organizational and oper-
ational structure of the customer's business and the disputed location's
place in that structure," further noting that such a determination is neces-
sarily fact-oriented. 41
The Decision ultimately held for the taxpayer, based on the judge's
finding that the tax division failed to meet its burden of proof.42 Signifi-
cantly, the judge pointed out that the tax division had had an opportunity
to seek additional information from the taxpayer through formal and in-
formal discovery and that "[s]ince the tax division has not complained
that [taxpayer] failed to provide any documents requested by the Tax Di-
vision, the Tax Division cannot object that its failure to make a prima
37. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,649 (Aug. 10, 1998).
38. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,899. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
39. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.333(o)(2) (1998).
40. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(d) (1998).




facie showing was due to [taxpayer's] failure to produce requested docu-
ments. '43 Although the Decision is favorable to the taxpayer, it is troub-
ling for several reasons, including its refusal to give weight to long-
standing comptroller interpretation of the phrase "identifiable segment."
The Decision's apparent invitation to the tax division to escape (easily?)
its burden of proof by requesting documents that the taxpayer is unable
to produce is also troubling. On the other hand, the decision is notewor-
thy for correctly pointing out that services that are not taxable because
they are multi-state services are not "exempt services," so that the stan-
dards for proving an exemption do not apply.
Once again, the comptroller issued multiple decisions that address con-
struction taxability issues. Decision 34,087,44 for example, involved a
contractor/taxpayer who claimed that materials and equipment he
purchased pursuant to a separated contract involving work for an exempt
entity were exempt from sales tax and that materials and equipment
purchased pursuant to separated contracts with developers improving
real property previously dedicated to exempt entities were also exempt.
However, the administrative law judge found that the taxpayer's con-
tracts were lump-sum contracts rather than separated contracts. 45 The
taxpayer's efforts to "interpret or clarify" the contracts through docu-
ments that were signed after the date of the original agreement and
(more importantly) after the date the work was completed did not, ac-
cording to the administrative law judge, in any way alter the findings that
the agreement was a lump-sum contract. The case is noteworthy not so
much for its finding on the particular facts at issue, but for its reiteration
of the controller's policy "that an amendment made before the comple-
tion of the contract will be recognized for sales tax purposes. 46 The tax-
payer's second contention, dealing with work for developers with respect
to property dedicated to tax exempt entities, also rested on a combined
fact-finding and legal conclusion. The case focuses on legal premise that
the title to purchased materials must pass to the developer prior to their
incorporation into realty. Based on the fact-finding that there was noth-
ing in the record to show that the title to the purchased material had
passed to the developer prior to incorporation, tax was imposed on those
contracts as well.47
43. Id.
44. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,087 (Jan. 14, 1998).
45. See id.; see also 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.292 (1998) (for the distinction between,
and the different tax treatment of, separated and lump sum contracts).
46. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,087.
47. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,793 (Apr. 15, 1998) (addressing
the taxability of certain services provided pursuant to a "Management and Concession
Agreement" between a taxpayer and the city); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,079
(July 7, 1998) (transmission line contract, which involved reusing about ten percent of the
original materials was not new construction); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,044
(July 29, 1998) (installation of vapor recovery system, including new pipeline, was not new
construction). [Notice a trend?] .
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Decision 36,51548 illustrates again how broadly section 151.00749 of the
Tax Code can be construed. The taxpayer sold and rented general safety
equipment and supplies, such as fire extinguishers and safety equipment
for oil and gas operations, and also supplied the instructing and training
with respect to certain safety matters. The taxpayer argued that it should
not be required to pay tax on instruction and training, safety supervisor
services, disassembly charges of the equipment, or certain maintenance or
fire extinguisher services. However, relying on the § 151.007(b) provision
that the amount for which a taxable item is sold "includes a service that is
a part of the sale," 50 the auditor scheduled these items for tax. After
discussing the cases cited by both the taxpayer and the tax division, the
administrative law judge focused on the fact that certain of the services at
issue (specifically safety instruction and safety supervisor) were included
in the audit only if they accompanied the rental of safety equipment and
concluded that this safety instruction and supervisor were part of the
equipment rental, the equipment rental being the essence of the
transaction.51
The case is noteworthy for its discussion not only of nontaxable serv-
ices that become taxable in the comptroller's view, but also for the case's
comments on the burden of proof. The decision points out that because
the taxpayer raised the exclusionary issue of maintenance, the tax divi-
sion was required to establish on its face both that the services at issue
were included in taxable services (real property and repair services in this
case) and that they were not the type of maintenance intended to be ex-
cluded from these services. However, based on the finding that the tax-
payer had-and had failed to meet-the responsibility to provide
adequate records upon request, the taxpayer nonetheless lost.
The taxpayer in Decision 36,34452 purchased ribbons, awards, t-shirts,
and other items to provide to public and private schools in the course of
providing its nontaxable instructional services. Because the taxpayer did
not bill its school customers for t-shirts, etc., the comptroller viewed the
taxpayer as having made a use of those items rather than having sold
them. Therefore, the taxpayer owed use tax on these items of tangible
personal property. This decision is consistent in many respects with the
comptroller's policy on mobile telephones that require the provider of a
mobile telephone to pay use tax on a phone that is "given" to a customer
in connection with the customer's agreement to purchase telephone serv-
ices from the seller.53 This case is also noteworthy because it expresses
again the comptroller's opinion that, if an issue for an audit period had
48. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,515 (Mar. 6, 1998).
49. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(b) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
50. Id.
51. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,515.
52. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,344 (Mar. 3, 1998).
53. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,619 (Jan. 12, 1998) (car dealer




not yet been resolved, a taxpayer must file subsequent returns consistent
with the auditor's position (and thereby risk making an interest-free loan
to the state) 54 or pay a penalty. 55
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The comptroller proposed or adopted several regulation amendments
to reflect 1997 legislative changes to the sales and use tax provisions. For
example, the comptroller amended Rule 3.285, regarding sales for resale,
to conform to the 1997 amendment to section 151.154(f) 56 stating that if a
purchaser uses a taxable item purchased tax free for resale as a trade-in
on the purchase of another taxable item, the purchaser is liable for sales
tax on the original purchase price of the taxable item used as a trade-in. 57
Rule 3.29758 was amended to make clarifications regarding the exemp-
tion for commercial vessels. Additional amendments were adopted as the
result of 1995 legislation to exempt supplies used in electrochemical plat-
ing by persons repairing jet turbine aircraft engines; to exempt electricity
and natural gas used in off-wing processing or repair for licensed or certif-
icated carriers; to extend the exemption to tangible personal property
that is necessary for the normal operations of the aircraft and is pumped,
poured, or otherwise placed in an aircraft owned or operated by a com-
mon carrier or flight school; to exempt aircraft purchased for use by flight
schools; to allow flight students to issue exemption certificates for certain
rentals; and to exempt items used in the repair, remodeling, or mainte-
nance of flight school aircraft.59
In line with 1997 legislative amendments to amusement services, the
comptroller amended rule 3.29860 to allow resellers of tickets to deduct
from reportable taxable sales the face value of tickets, less the included
sales tax, purchased from non-permitted purchasers, provided the tickets
had tax included when purchased.61
Amendments have been proposed to rule 3.31662 concerning occa-
sional and tax-free sales to reflect the 1997 legislative change imposing a
$5,000 ceiling on the selling price of a taxable item that qualifies as an
exempt sale by certain academic or student organizations. 63
54. Texas does not pay interest on refunds granted through administrative, rather than
judicial, channels. However, Comptroller Carole Keeton Rylander, who became comptrol-
ler after the survey period, announced her intention to recommend a long-needed legisla-
tive change to authorize interest payment on such refunds. In the absence of such
authority, taxpayers who pay more tax than they are ultimately found to owe have, in
effect, made an interest-free loan to the state.
55. See also infra note 137 and accompanying text.
56. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.154(f) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
57. See 23 Tex. Reg. 7381 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285).
58. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (1998).
59. See 23 Tex. Reg. 8182 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297).
60. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298 (1998).
61. See 23 Tex. Reg. 7381 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298).
62. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316 (1998).




Rule 3.32964 concerning refunds available to enterprise projects and to
qualified businesses in enterprise zones was amended as a result of 1997
legislation, which provides for the creation of defense economic readjust-
ment zones and the designation of defense readjustment projects. The
amendments set forth the definitions, refunds available, and refund re-
quirements for such projects.65
The comptroller amended the staff leasing services rule, Rule 3.364,66
to reflect changes made by the 1997 legislation to the Labor Code, which
regulates the staff leasing industry. The definition of "Staff Leasing Com-
pany" was amended to avoid the necessity of changing the comptroller's
rule each time the Labor Code is changed concerning staff leasing
services. 67
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
The case 3 Beall Brothers 3, Inc. v. Sharp68 challenged the "additional
tax" imposed by section 171.00169 on the ground that it unconstitutionally
imposes unequal tax burdens on similarly situated taxpayers. 3 Bealls
Brothers' accounting year ended January 31. When it ceased doing busi-
ness on August 2, 1993, according to the comptroller it owed the "addi-
tional tax" based on eighteen months. However, corporate taxpayers
with a calendar year-end that dissolved on the same date paid the "addi-
tional tax" based only on seven months. The taxpayer relied heavily on
Bullock v. Sage Energy Co.,70 in which the court held that the comptrol-
ler's method of determining franchise tax liability was unconstitutional,
arguing that the comptroller's interpretation of the statute treated simi-
larly situated taxpayers differently. The taxpayer also raised other consti-
tutional arguments, based on its contention that it had already paid the
tax and that the "additional tax" was not related to services provided to
the corporation by the state (which, after all, had ceased doing business)
and that it did not have nexus for purposes of the additional tax. In a
letter ruling, the district court judge concluded that Beall Brothers' argu-
ment that it should not pay the tax is valid, holding that: "There is no
rational basis for fixing different measures of the additional tax time for
computing [earned surplus] for similarly situated corporations, based
solely on the accounting year used by the respective corporations."'71
Another of the cases to reach the courthouse to challenge the applica-
64. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.329 (1998).
65. 23 Tex. Reg. 4311 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.329).
66. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.364 (1998).
67. See 23 Tex. Reg. 4314 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.364).
68. No. 97-05710 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. June 25, 1998).
69. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
70. 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.).
71. No. 97-05710. The comptroller filed a Notice of Intent to Appeal. This case is




tion of the additional tax is B&A Marketing v. Sharp.72 B&A Marketing,
a calendar-year-end taxpayer, dissolved on December 12, 1992, and was
assessed the additional tax by the comptroller. Relying on a literal read-
ing of the underlying Tax Code section as it was in effect from 1992 until
1994, B&A Marketing argued that the additional tax could be imposed
only on corporations that are subject to the taxable capital but not to the
earned surplus tax. Therefore, because B&A Marketing was not subject
to taxable capital tax for the year at issue, it concluded (logically) that it
could not be liable for the additional tax imposed by section 171.001.
Like 3 Beall Brothers, B&A Marketing also argued that the statute was
unconstitutional on the ground it discriminated against dissolved corpora-
tions and B&A Marketing further pointed out that, as a dissolved corpo-
ration, it had no nexus. The district court ruled in favor of B&A
Marketing in August of 1998, concluding that under the literal language
of the statute, B&A Marketing was not in the class of corporations sub-
ject to tax.73
In Arch Petroleum, Inc. v. Sharp,74 the court held that Series A con-
vertible redeemable preferred stock obligations are debt and may be ex-
cluded from surplus. Arch Petroleum sold to Citicorp the shares at issue
under an agreement that contained a mandatory redemption feature re-
quiring Arch to pay seven million dollars for redemption, and a converti-
bility feature that allowed Citicorp to convert some or all of the preferred
stock for common stock prior to the redemption date. The court found
that the conversion feature did not cause the obligation to be contingent
(and thus includable in surplus) because the conversion feature "did not
render questionable whether the obligation had been incurred, but only
how it would be satisfied-by cash or shares of common stock. ''75 Fur-
ther, the court found that the obligation was measured in a certain
amount of money since the seven million dollar redemption price was set
by the parties to the agreement and was not an estimate or forecast.
"[T]he statute requires only that the obligation be measured in an amount
of money; there is no requirement that it be satisfied in that amount of
money."'76 The court concluded that exercise of the conversion option
would not reduce or eliminate Arch Petroleum's obligation; rather it
would only have changed the form by which the obligation may be
satisfied.
In the long-awaited Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. Sharp,77 the court of
appeals held that the value of future rental expense under long-term op-
erating leases could not be deducted in calculating franchise tax. After
examining the rules of statutory construction and the legislative history
72. No. 97-01522 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Sept. 25, 1998).
73. See id. The comptroller filed a Notice of Intent to Appeal.
74. 958 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.)
75. Id. at 478.
76. Id. at 479.
77. 962 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
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and intent of Tax Code section 171.109,78 the court held that in order for
an obligation to meet the definition of "debt" and be deductible for
franchise tax purposes, first the "debt" must be a liability under GAAP,
and second, the obligation must satisfy the restricted definition of "debt"
in section 171.109(a)(3)79 (defining "debt" as any legally enforceable obli-
gation measured in a certain amount of money which must be performed
or paid within an ascertainable period of time). Although both the tax-
payer and the tax division agreed that the future rental expense falls
within the (a)(3) definition, both parties also agreed that the future oper-
ating lease rental expenses were not "debt" according to GAAP.
The taxpayer in Decision 36,76980 relied on Arch Petroleumst in assert-
ing that the vested portion of the taxpayer's "Shadow Stock" should be
excluded from surplus. In the now familiar scenario in which taxpayers
argue that amounts are deductible from surplus for franchise tax pur-
poses as debt and the comptroller argues (frequently successfully) that
the amounts at issue are not deductible, the taxpayer argued that it
should be allowed to deduct from surplus the liabilities arising in connec-
tion with its "Shadow Stock" plan. Employees of the company who re-
ceived Shadow Stock were entitled to receive cash payments equivalent
to the amount of a declared common stock dividend as well as to partici-
pate in the growth and appreciation of the Shadow Stock. Among the
several important facts on which the taxpayer focused are the following:
as of December 31 of any year, the vested number of Shadow Stock
shares is capable of exact determination; the Shadow Stock Plan consti-
tutes a "legally enforceable obligation" pursuant to sec-
tion 171.109(a)(3);82 and the amounts are payable on demand. In
declining to follow Arch Petroleum, on the grounds that the facts are dif-
ferent, the administrative law judge concluded that the amounts at issue
in the comptroller hearing "do not qualify as debt under Section
171.109(a)(3) because they are not measured in a certain amount of
money. '83 Concluding that even though the precise value of the vested
portion could be calculated as of December 31, the administrative law
judge focused on his finding that the taxpayer's actual liability remained
unknown because each participating employee's surrender date was not
yet determined.
Decision 32,42184 involved an oil and gas company's contentions that
its deferred income taxes were improperly included in surplus and that a
portion of its percentage depletion, as reported on its federal tax return,
was also improperly included in surplus. One of the issues addressed by
this case is the treatment of "built-in gain" of a taxpayer that converted
78. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.009 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998) (defining surplus).
79. Id. See also 962 S.W.2d at 727.
80. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,769 (June 16, 1984).
81. 958 S.W.2d 475.
82. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3) (Vernon 1992).
83. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acct's, Hearing No. 36,769.
84. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,421 (June 3, 1998).
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from "C" to "S" status. Following its conversion from C corporation to
S corporation, the taxpayer reported the tax on its built-in gain on its
federal tax returns and on its financial statements. The taxpayer's finan-
cial statements for 1992 (four years after the conversion to "S" status)
reflected the deferred income tax liability. The taxpayer characterized its
position as unique in that it was a substantial company that elected "S"
status, and the taxpayer noted that there were no specific accounting pro-
nouncements to deal with its situation. Its evidence concerning account-
ing treatment established that the taxpayer had properly reported the
deferred income taxes according to GAAP. The amount could, there-
fore, be deducted from surplus in accordance with section 171.109(i)(3), 85
which, for the year at issue, provided that deferred income taxes could be
excluded from surplus to the extent recognized under GAAP.
The taxpayer did not prevail on its other primary contention, regarding
its use of percentage depletion. The taxpayer argued that because it was
entitled to use the federal income tax method in determining its franchise
tax liability, and because the federal tax laws allow for depletion below an
asset's cost, the taxpayer should be permitted to reduce its assets below
cost, thereby reducing its taxable capital base. Although the administra-
tive law judge originally ruled in the taxpayer's favor on this issue, in the
final decision, he held in favor of the tax division, summarizing the issue
as "whether the permitted use of an accounting method used for report-
ing federal income tax in lieu of using a GAAP accounting method over-
rides the fundamental statutory framework of the taxable capital
component of the Texas franchise tax."' 86 The judge therefore concluded
that the taxpayer "cannot merely rely upon an accounting method used
on its federal income tax to confer upon it substantive benefits that were
neither intended to be granted by the legislature nor sanctioned by the
framework of the Texas franchise tax."'87
Although it is too early in the statute's history to have published hear-
ings decisions on the tax consequences of a Texas entity's relying on new
law to convert into another entity (e.g., a corporation conversion into a
limited partnership), 88 the comptroller has issued several rulings on such
conversions in the last few months. These rulings indicate, consistent
with prior comptroller policy, that an entity that is a partnership under
Texas law will not be subject to franchise tax even if it elects to be taxed
as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. 89
Decision 34,86790 presented an interesting issue in the context of a life
85. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(i)(3) (Vernon 1992).
86. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,421. Does phrasing the issue in terms of
whether an accounting method "overrides the fundamental statutory framework" give a
good hint as to the ultimate outcome of this case?
87. Id.
88. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 5.17 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (added by Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 375, § 32).
89. See, e.g., Ltr. 9806542L (June 17, 1998); Ltr. 9807637L (July 9, 1998).
90. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,867 (Aug. 18, 1998).
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insurance company's treatment of compensation of its officers and direc-
tors for franchise tax purposes. The taxpayer argued convincingly (and
correctly) that the officer/director compensation add-back 9' did not apply
to a life insurance company that was ultimately owned by a mutual life
insurance company that had no shareholders. Section 171.110 requires
that the compensation of officers and directors be added to a taxpayer's
taxable income in determining its reportable taxable income for earned
surplus purposes unless the corporation has no more than thirty-five
shareholders. The taxpayer pointed out that because its ultimate parent
is a mutual life insurance company that has no shareholders, it has fewer
than thirty-five shareholders and, therefore, may not be required to add
back the compensation of its officers and directors. The tax division ar-
gued unpersuasively (and incorrectly) that "shareholder" in the statute
was intended to be interpreted broadly enough to include not only share-
holders, but also policyholders. The administrative law judge, agreeing
with the taxpayer that the statutory reference to the word "members"
referred only to members of a limited liability company and not to policy-
holders of a mutual life insurance company, granted the taxpayer's con-
tention.92 This case is also noteworthy for its analysis of the relevant rule
and for its focus on the burden of proof question.
Other cases focus on interpretation of the relatively new sec-
tion 171.1061,93 which provides that an item of income included in the
corporation's taxable earned surplus, other than dividends and interest,
"that a state other than this state or a country, other than the United
States, cannot tax because the activities generating that item of income do
not have sufficient unitary connection with the corporation's other activi-
ties conducted within that state or country under the United States Con-
stitution," is allocated to Texas if the corporation's commercial domicile
is in Texas.94
Decision 36,009,95 for example, focused on whether a non-business in-
come deduction claimed by the taxpayer should be allocated to New
Jersey (the taxpayer's domicile) or apportioned to Texas. Decision
35,23996 also addressed section 171.1061. In one of the longer decisions
issued during the survey period, the administrative law judge discussed at
length the taxpayer's two contentions, specifically whether its royalty in-
come from "passive patents" was subject to apportionment and whether,
if its income from the passive patents is apportioned, such income should
be included in gross receipts everywhere. In this hearing, the taxpayer
91. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998) (requiring that
compensation of certain corporate officers and directors be added to the earned surplus tax
base).
92. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,867.
93. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1061 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
94. Id.
95. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,009 (May 5, 1998).
96. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,239 (May 5, 1998) (After the survey pe-




described its "active" patents as those that produced royalty income for
the taxpayer pursuant to licensing agreements with foreign subsidiaries
and others. The parties agreed that the royalties from the active patents
are part of taxpayer's unitary business. By contrast, the "passive" patents
were not used for taxpayer's business carried out in Texas. The adminis-
trative law judge concluded that the passive royalty income at issue was
part of the taxpayer's overall unitary business and that the taxpayer's use
of foreign subsidiaries to develop products and the foreign source of the
income did not prohibit this income from being apportioned to Texas.
The judge further held that the passive royalty income should be included
in gross receipts everywhere. 97
In Decisions 35,797 and 35,798,98 a corporate REIT successfully chal-
lenged the comptroller's prior policy (evidenced by several letters to tax-
payers between 1992 and 1995) that dividends to shareholders could not
be deducted from reportable federal taxable income by REITs. Ac-
knowledging that this was a case of first impression and adopting the rea-
soning of other states that have faced this issue, the judge held that net
taxable earned surplus is computed by determining the corporation's re-
portable federal taxable income, and that under the Internal Revenue
Code the reportable federal taxable income for a REIT takes into ac-
count the deduction for the dividends paid to the shareholders. The tax
division argued strongly (to no avail) that allowing the dividends paid
deduction would result in REITs being treated differently from other cor-
porations, that the legislature clearly intended that there be no such ex-
emption, and that the comptroller's long-standing policy had been
accepted by the legislature. The case is significant both for its correct
adherence to the statutory provisions and for the importance of the
judge's determination that earned surplus must be calculated by refer-
ence to federal taxable income. 99
The taxpayer in Decision 30,897,100 an oil and gas company, established
that both the financial accounting standards board and the SEC had
promulgated standards for accounting and reporting by oil and gas com-
panies to ensure that the reported values of oil and gas properties do not
exceed the lesser of the assets' net book value and their fair market value
as measured in accordance with GAAP. The taxpayer's evidence showed
that these standards effectively created a "ceiling" for the value of the
97. See id.; see also Polaroid v. Sharp, No. 97-00785 (201st Dist. Ct. Travis County,
Tex.) that also addresses unitary tax issues. Polaroid received a $1 billion payment from
Kodak in settlement of a patent infringement suit. In this case, apparently the first time a
Texas court has addressed what is unitary income for franchise tax purposes, Polaroid ar-
gued that the tax effectively was a retroactive tax on its income and that single factor gross
receipt was inappropriate, and that the income at issue was simply not unitary. See also
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,858 (Sept. 30, 1998) (income from both royalties
and sale of trademark was unitary income).
98. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 35,797-35,798 (Dec. 3, 1997).
99. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,800 (Jan. 21, 1998) (allowing a
dividends-paid deduction to a closed-end investment company that elected to be treated as
a regulated investment company (RIC) for federal income tax purposes).
100. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,897 (Dec. 9, 1997).
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assets to which the standards (the "ceiling test") applied. The taxpayer
further showed that to the extent the adjustments that resulted from the
ceiling test were part of its contra-asset accounts for depreciation, deple-
tion and amortization, those adjustments must be taken into account in
computing surplus. Thus, section 171.109(i)(2),101 which specifically au-
thorizes taxpayers to exclude from surplus, "to the extent they are in con-
formance with generally accepted accounting principles.., a contra-asset
account for depletion, depreciation, or amortization,"'' 0 2 authorizes the
taxpayer to exclude from surplus the ceiling test adjustment.
Decision 36,071103 is another of several "throwback" cases issued dur-
ing the last year. The taxpayer's sole contact with the State of California,
to which it delivered goods, was solicitation of sales. The tax division and
the taxpayer agreed that taxpayer's California solicitation activity did not
exceed the scope of activities protected under Public Law 86-272.104
Although the parties agreed that the receipts for California sales would
not be "thrown back to Texas so long as the taxpayer was subject to tax in
California," there appeared to be some inconsistency in determining ex-
actly what "subject to taxation" means. An earlier proposed decision in
another case, Decision 35,480,105 concluded that Rule 3.557(e)(37)(I) 10 6
was in conflict with section 171.1032107 (as in effect until January 1994),
and would have provided precedent for a taxpayer victory in this case,
given that the taxpayer had "constitutional nexus" with California. How-
ever, when the comptroller declined to adopt that proposed decision, he
also declined to rule in the taxpayer's favor in this later case. Instead, the
administrative law judge in Hearing 36,071, relied on the earlier case
which held that:
The purpose of apportionment is to ensure that Texas fairly imposes
a tax on its share of income earned by a corporation. If no other
state can tax the income related to a sale of tangible personal prop-
erty which originated in Texas, then it is fair to "throwback" that sale
to Texas in the apportionment calculation. 108
Decision 36,071 is interesting for its focus on what "subject to tax"
means, and on its discussion of California versus Texas law.
Decision 35,480109 concerns the throwback, for earned surplus appor-
tionment purposes, of sales receipts from tangible personal property
shipped from Texas to states in which the taxpayer claimed to be "subject
to taxation" based on constitutional nexus. Although the original pro-
posed decision was in the taxpayer's favor (on the ground that section
101. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(i)(2) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
102. Id.
103. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,071 (July 22, 1998).
104. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84
(1994).
105. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,480 (July 7, 1998).
106. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(37)(1).
107. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1032 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
108. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,071.
109. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,480.
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3.557(e)(37)(I) 110 should not be applied to the 1992 and 1993 report
years), the ultimate decision finds in favor of the tax division, relying in
part on an amendment to the statute made in 1993 that was termed a
''clarification" of the statute.
The taxpayer in Decision 35,984111 asserted that including receipts
from the sales of certain medicine and drugs for gross receipts calcula-
tions in determining taxable earned surplus but not taxable capital is un-
constitutional. Section 171.104112 provides that a corporation may deduct
from its receipts, for taxable capital purposes, the amount of receipts
from sales of certain items (including certain health care supplies exempt
from sales tax under section 151.313113) if the items are shipped from
outside the state. The administrative law judge, however, concluded that
because the statutory provision did not make reference to the earned sur-
plus provision, the legislature must not have meant for the exclusion to
apply to earned surplus. 114
Consolidated Decision 35,481-35,482 and the accompanying consoli-
dated Decision 35,477-35,478115 also focus on a gross receipts issue:
whether the gross receipts from the taxpayer's "subscription contracts"
are Texas receipts. The taxpayer develops and provides educational
training and informational programming through several broadcast net-
works that the taxpayer operates. The programs broadcast only to sub-
scribers, not to the general viewing public. In preparing its Texas
franchise tax returns, the taxpayer treated the gross receipts from its sub-
scriber agreements as gross receipts from intangibles, and therefore (con-
sistent with the location of the payor rule) apportioned the receipts to the
states from which the subscription contract revenue was generated.
Gross receipts from video networks were allocated to the state of destina-
tion where tangible personal property was delivered. The taxpayer ar-
gued quite reasonably that the overall objective or essence of its
subscription contracts is "the receipt and the right to review the pro-
grams ... at the subscriber's locations," and that the purchase of a right
to view a program is the purchase of intangible property. 116
The tax division, which ultimately prevailed in this case, argued that
"since taxpayer's product has a physical existence, i.e., either in the form
of electronic signals or a tape recording, the product offered by petitioner
does not fall within the definition of an intangible,"1117 and that peti-
tioner's programs should be treated as services. The administrative law
judge concluded, perhaps more as a fact-finding than a conclusion of law,
that the taxpayer's subscribers had contracted "for the performance of a
110. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(37)(I).
111. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,984 (Jan. 5, 1998).
112. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
113. Id. § 151.313.
114. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,984.






service, the preparation, production and delivery of educational pro-
grams," and had not acquired an intangible asset. 118
The taxpayer also argued that the services were performed at the loca-
tion where the programs were delivered, relying on Decision 10,028,119 in
which the administrative law judge held that a portion of the television
broadcaster's gross receipts must be allocated to New Mexico to reflect
the fact that those programs were first transmitted from Texas to New
Mexico. Treating this case as one of first impression, on the ground that
other comptroller decisions have not addressed the issue of apportion-
ment of gross receipts generated by services not involved in specific
comptroller rules, the administrative law judge focused on determining
"the essence of the agreement petitioner has made with its subscribers,"
and concluded that the subscribers are contracting for the provision of
educational programs, and that the mode of transmission, whether broad-
cast live or taped production or videotape is secondary. 120 The adminis-
trative law judge ultimately determined that the services were not
provided at the location where the programs were delivered.' 21
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
In one of the most significant regulatory amendments of the survey
period, the comptroller revised Rule 3.558,122 dealing with officer and di-
rector compensation as included in earned surplus computation. The
amendment 123 changes the concept of an "officer" of a corporation
(other than a banking corporation) to require add-back of such person's
compensation only if that person holds an office created by the board of
directors or pursuant to certain corporate organizational documents and
has legal authority to bind the corporation with third parties by executing
contracts or other legal documents.1 24 The amended rule sets forth a re-
buttable presumption that a person is an officer, allowing the taxpayer to
rebut this presumption by showing that the person does not participate or
have authority to participate in significant policymaking aspects of the
corporate operations. 125 Although the amendment states that the
changes "clarify" the definition of officer, these changes appear to reflect
a substantial change in comptroller policy. In fact, several court and ad-
ministrative cases are pending with respect to the constitutionality of the
compensation add-back. 126
118. See id.
119. Id. (citing Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 10,028).
120. See id. It is easy to imagine the frustration of the taxpayer in this case with the
Decision's finding both that the essence of its transaction was not an intangible and that
the essence of the transaction was the provision of educational programs.
121. See id.
122. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558 (1998).
123. See 23 Tex. Reg. 6412 (199), adopted 23 Tex. Reg.8462 (1998).
124. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(b)(10)(B).
125. Id.
126. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,057 (Mar. 17, 1997) (focusing on a
multi-tiered corporate group with an ultimate parent that was a foreign corporation); see
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The comptroller also amended Rule 3.544,127 concerning consolidated
reports and payments, to reflect 1997 legislative changes relating to the
filing of amended reports as a result of an audit by the IRS or other com-
petent authority, or as a result of the filing of an amended IRS return or
other return. The amendments added a new subsection regarding the
statute of limitations for a franchise tax liability that is affected by an IRS
administrative proceeding (including an audit) or a judicial proceeding,
requiring a final determination affecting the franchise tax liability to be
reported to the comptroller within sixty days after the determination be-
comes final. The rule was also amended to provide that a consolidated or
combined report is not allowed. 128
The comptroller also adopted an amendment to Rule 3.545129 to con-
form with 1997 legislative changes concerning extension payments made
by taxpayers requesting an extension for the time in which to file an an-
nual franchise tax report.1 30
Rule 3.549131 as amended now includes a provision to reflect the legis-
lative statement that revenues from trademarks, franchise and licenses
are, for reports due on or after January 1, 1998, are included in Texas
receipts to the extent used in Texas, and to provide that if services are
performed inside and outside Texas, the receipts are Texas receipts "on
the basis of the fair value of the services rendered in Texas. ''132
The comptroller also amended rule 3.556133 to reflect 1997 legislative
changes updating the definition of the IRC and adding provisions dealing
primarily with computation for a qualified subchapter S subsidiary
(QSSS) and adding a definition of a QSSS. The rule provides that a
QSSS will be treated as an S corporation for earned surplus computation
purposes.1 34
Rule 3.562,135 concerning limited liability companies, was amended to
reflect additional changes enacted by the 1997 legislature, as well as to
acknowledge the "check the box" regulations issued by the IRS. These
changes reflect comptroller policy on the computation of reportable fed-
eral taxable income for limited liability companies that are treated as sole
also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,479 (Sept. 24, 1998), in which the tax division
noted that it was "not inclined to speculate on a change to rule 3.558 which has not yet
been published in the Texas Register." This argument is disingenuous at best, given the
frequency (e.g., in the prior contract cases, discussed supra at notes 7-10 and accompanying
text) with which hearings attorneys rely on agency policy that has not yet been published in
the Texas Register.
127. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.544 (1998).
128. See 23 Tex. Reg. 6144 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.544).
129. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.545 (1998).
130. See 23 Tex. Reg. 3012 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.545).
131. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (1998).
132. 23 Tex. Reg. 3010 (1998) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.549).
133. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.556 (1998).
134. See 23 Tex. Reg. 4316 (198) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.556); see also 23
Tex. Reg. 3018 (1998). For amendments to earned surplus computation rule, see 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.555 (1998).
135. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562 (1998).
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proprietorships, divisions or branches of corporations or corporations.
For example, the rule provides that a single-member limited liability com-
pany that is treated as a divisional branch of a corporation for federal tax
purposes will compute its "reportable federal taxable income" for
franchise tax purposes as though the limited liability company were a sep-
arate corporation for federal income tax purposes. Thus, a single-mem-
ber limited liability company that is treated as a corporate division or
branch for federal income tax purposes will compute its reportable fed-
eral taxable income for franchise tax purposes in the same manner as a
limited liability company that is treated as a corporation for federal tax
purposes. The rule also addresses the treatment of the distributive share
of income and distributions from limited liability companies treated as a
division or branch of a corporation for federal income tax purposes. 136
Rule 3.568137 was amended 138 to add a new subsection to provide that
an entity that is subject to franchise tax prior to conversion, and that con-
tinues to be subject to franchise tax after conversion, will not have a new
beginning date for franchise tax, and to make other changes to acknowl-
edge the possibility of conversion from one entity to another. The rule
was further amended to reflect recent legislation requiring certain entities
obtain a certificate that franchise taxes have been paid prior to dissolving
or withdrawing from Texas.
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF TAX/EXEMPTIONS
The Austin Court of Appeals in Hays County Appraisal District v.
Southwest Texas State University'139 denied the public property exemption
for a building and parking lot owned by a nonprofit corporation (South-
west Texas State University Foundation) and leased to a government en-
tity (Southwest Texas State University).' 40 The public property
exemption under section 11.11 of the Tax Code14' exempts property
owned by the state or a political subdivision of the state that is used for
public purposes.' 42 Because there was no firm, enforceable agreement
between the university and the foundation providing that legal title to the
property would be transferred to the university at some time, the court
concluded that the university did not have equitable title to the property
and was not entitled to the public property exemption. 143 Furthermore,
136. See 23 Tex. Reg. 4317 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562).
137. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.568 (1998).
138. See 23 Tex. Reg. 3020 (1998) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.568).
139. 973 S.W. 2d 419 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
140. See id. at 423.
141. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
142. See id. § 11.11(a).
143. See 973 S.W.2d at 422. The foundation and the university contended that the foun-
dation would transfer the property to the university upon the university's payment of the
mortgage on the property; however, the lease was silent on the issue of transfer of title.
See id. In addition, the trustees of the foundation approved a resolution stating that the
foundation intended to donate the property to the university upon full payment of the
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the court reasoned that the property did not satisfy the "public purpose"
requirement set forth in the public property exemption because the prop-
erty was not used exclusively for public purposes given that twenty per-
cent of the building and two-thirds of the parking lot were leased for
activities unrelated to the university. 144
In another case involving principles of equitable ownership, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals in Harris County Appraisal District v. South-
east Texas Housing Finance Corp.145 held that Southeast Texas Housing
Finance Corporation (Southeast) had equitable title to housing projects
in which legal title was held by its subsidiaries, thereby entitling South-
east to the public property exemption on the housing projects. 146 South-
east, a government entity, used bond proceeds to purchase and
rehabilitate housing properties. Upon acquisition, Southeast would
transfer legal title to the property to a subsidiary corporation in exchange
for a note secured by the property. Under the charters of each subsidi-
ary, legal title to the properties reverts to Southeast upon full payment of
the debt or upon dissolution of the subsidiary. In addition, Southeast and
each subsidiary had interlocking directors. The appraisal district asserted
that Southeast did not have equitable title to the properties and merely
possessed a contingent remainder interest in the properties. In conclud-
ing that Southeast had equitable title to the properties, the court rea-
soned that the only circumstance in which there was a possibility that
Southeast might not receive title is if there were a default on the bonds;
however, even in this case Southeast would have had the option of curing
the default or foreclosing.1 47 Thus, the court concluded that real and ben-
eficial use of the properties rests with Southeast.148
The Attorney General in Opinion No. DM-463149 addressed the free-
mortgage. See id. However, the court concluded that this resolution did not establish a
legally enforceable obligation on the part of the foundation to transfer the property to the
university. See id.
144. See id.
145. 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 3785 (Amarillo June 24, 1998) (not designated for
publication).
146. See id.
147. See id. The court's logic here seems to be tenuous given that the option to cure
default and acquire ownership does not necessarily mean that Southeast would acquire
ownership of the property. Indeed, if the cost to cure the default exceeded the value of the
property at the time of the default, Southeast likely would not acquire the property. The
court's strongest rationale, however, is that preventing Southeast from being treated as
equitable owner of the property for property tax purposes would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the housing finance corporation legislation, which provides that housing finance
corporations and all property owned by them are intended to be exempt from property
taxes. See id.
148. Id. at . The Southwest Texas State Univ. and Southeast Texas Housing Finance
Corp. cases illustrate the importance of carefully documenting a lease or other transaction
between a governmental entity and a private entity so that, if the parties so desire, the
governmental entity can validly claim equitable ownership of the property for property tax
purposes. In Southwest Texas State Univ., the lease between the university and the founda-
tion likely could have been written to expressly provide that ownership of the relevant
property automatically transfers to the university upon payment of the mortgage without
affecting the business understanding between the parties.
149. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-463 (1997).
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port exemption under section 11.251,150 which provides that property (i)
that is detained in Texas for assembling, storing, manufacturing, process-
ing or fabricating, and (ii) is transported outside Texas within 175 days
after the date the owner acquired the property or imported it into Texas,
is exempt. 15' The issue presented in this opinion is whether a property
owner (X) is entitled to a freeport exemption on air conditioning com-
pressors that are sold by X to a third-party that incorporates the compres-
sors into other goods that are then delivered outside of Texas within 175
days after X acquired the raw materials used to construct the compres-
sors. The Attorney General concluded that the freeport exemption is not
limited to property owned by a single person during the time it is in
Texas. 152 Thus, the compressors qualify for the freeport exemption. 153
The Attorney General noted that some portions of section 11.251 assume
that freeport goods are continuously owned by one person during the
time they are located in Texas; however, section 11.251(k), 154 the most
specific provision on this issue, expressly states that property which other-
wise meets the requirements of the freeport exemption is exempt regard-
less of whether the person who owns it on January 1 is the person who
transports its outside Texas. 155 This opinion also implicitly indicates that
the goods need not be in the same form when they leave the state that
they are in when the 175-day period begins to run.156
In Opinion No. DM-456,157 the Attorney General concluded that a
150. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
151. See id. § 11.251(b).
152. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-463 (1997). In a circumstance in which a property
owner transfers property to another Texas property owner and the property would be eligi-
ble for the freeport exemption if the property stayed in the state for less than 175 days, it
would be prudent for the transferring property owner to secure (through contract or other
means) an obligation of the transferee to (i) notify the transferor with respect to how long
the transferred property remains in the state with the transferee, and (ii) to provide sup-
porting documents, so that the transferor can establish that the freeport exemption applies
with respect to the transferred property.
153. See id.
154. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251(k) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
155. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-463 (1997); see Cynthia M. Ohlenforst, et al.,
Annual Survey of Texas Law: Taxation, 47 SMU L. REV. 1649, 1673 (1994), for a discussion
of § 11.251(k).
156. In Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-448 (1997), the Attorney General also addressed
the applicability of a property tax exemption in ruling that property designated as agricul-
tural property is not subject to rollback tax upon its acquisition by a government entity,
and that a rollback tax lien is not revived upon a subsequent transfer of the property from
the government entity to a taxable entity. See id.
157. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-456 (1997). Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 98-001 (1998)
also addressed tax abatement agreements. In this opinion, the Attorney General con-
cluded that TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.402(d) (Vernon 1992), which provides that prop-
erty located in a reinvestment zone that is owned or leased by a member of the
commissioners court may not be subject to a tax abatement agreement, does not apply in a
circumstance in which a member of the commissioners court owns a very small percentage
of shares in the publicly-held corporation entering into the tax abatement agreement. The
Attorney General based his conclusion on the fact that owning such a small portion of an
interest in a publicly-held corporation does not entitle the owner to effective control of
such entity and that the terms "owned" and "owner" in chapter 312 of the Tax Code refer
to a property interest that includes at least some degree of control over the property. See
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county cannot amend a tax abatement agreement by deleting land from
an existing reinvestment zone.158 The Attorney General based his con-
clusion on the lack of express authority allowing for the boundaries of
reinvestment zones created under chapter 312 of the Tax Code (the Tax
Abatement Act159) to be amended. 160 Conversely, chapter 311 of the Tax
Code (the Tax Increment Financing Act) 161 expressly allows for bounda-
ries of a reinvestment zone created under that Act to be enlarged or re-
duced, thereby implying that the failure of chapter 312 to provide for the
enlargement or reduction of boundaries of reinvestment zones created
under chapter 312 means that such zones cannot be amended. 162 The
Attorney General also concluded that property within a county reinvest-
ment zone under chapter 312 must be contiguous, 163 that a reinvestment
zone under chapter 312 cannot include all or a part of a building unless
the zone includes the land on which the building is located, 164 and that a
reinvestment zone under chapter 312 cannot include only a floor of a
multi-story building. 165 The Attorney General reached these conclusions
largely because the terms "zone" and "area" as used in Chapter 312 com-
monly refer to a parcel of land or a portion of the earth's surface and not
portions of improvements. 166
id. The conclusion makes sense given that any other result would make it difficult for some
publicly-held corporations whose stock is widely held to enter into tax abatement
agreements.
158. See id. It is unclear why the commissioners court desired to delete property from
the reinvestment zone. It is possible that the county desired to delete the property so that
it could be placed in a different reinvestment zone, which would allow for differing abate-
ment terms than applied to property in the original reinvestment zone. With certain excep-
tions, agreements made with owners of property in a reinvestment zone must contain
identical terms as to the portion of the value of the property that is to be exempt and the
duration of the exemption. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.204(b) (Vernon 1992). It may
be possible, however, to achieve the same result by having the taxing entity and the prop-
erty owner enter into an economic development agreement under section 380.001 or
381.004 of the Local Government Code. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T. CODE ANN. §§ 380.001
and 381.004 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
159. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 312.001-312.402 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
160. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-456 (1997).
161. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 311.001-311.017 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
162. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-456 (1997).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. If a government entity and a taxpayer desire for a separate floor of a build-
ing to have a different property tax exemption, or a different term, than other floors of the
property, it may be possible to enter into an economic development agreement under the
Texas Local Government Code to achieve such a result. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE
ANN. §§ 380.001 & 381.004 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
166. See id. The court did not address whether two separate reinvestment zones could
apply to a single property in a circumstance in which the property is divided vertically or
horizontally, e.g., the north end of the building is in one reinvestment zone, and the south
end of the building is in another reinvestment zone. Based on the rationale applied by the
Attorney General, this type of action should be allowed by chapter 312 of the Tax Code
given that each portion of the building sits on property which could be divided into sepa-




In Motorola, Inc. v. Tarrant County Appraisal District,167 the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of section 11.251(h)
of the Tax Code. 168 Section 11.251(h) provides that an appraisal district
may request a taxpayer claiming the freeport exemption to supply the
appraisal district with copies of inventory or property records to deter-
mine amount of the freeport exemption. 169 The statute further provides
that failure to do so within thirty days after request results in the property
owner forfeiting the exemption. 17" In this case, Motorola claimed the
freeport exemption but failed to provide the appraisal district any infor-
mation supporting its claim of freeport exemption within thirty days after
request. The district court granted the appraisal district summary judg-
ment concerning the exemption because it concluded that Motorola for-
feited the exemption for failure to timely comply with section
11.251(h).171 Motorola asserted that section 11.251(h) is unconstitutional
because it arbitrarily forfeits the constitutionally-mandated freeport ex-
emption in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 172 The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that it is not
constitutionally unreasonable or arbitrary to place a thirty-day deadline
on filing supporting documentation. 173
In Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal District,174 two
school districts sought to compel the appraisal district to revoke retroac-
tively the charitable exemption of a hospital for the previous five years
because the hospital had been during that period leased to for-profit or-
ganizations. The school districts asserted that sections 11.43(i) and 25.21
of the Tax Code 175 authorize the school districts to compel reconsidera-
tion of the exemption for the previous five years. Section 11.43(i) pro-
vides that if the chief appraiser discovers that an exemption that is not
required to be claimed annually has been allowed erroneously in any one
of the five preceding years, the chief appraiser shall add to the tax roll the
property or appraised value that was erroneously exempted. 76 Section
25.21 sets forth a similar provision for property omitted from the tax
167. 980 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
168. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251(h) (Vernon 1992).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See 980 S.W.2d at 901.
172. Motorola also argued that the freeport exemption is self-executing and thus im-
mune from statutory limitations such as that provided in section 11.251(h). In response,
the court of appeals stated that although the exemption is self-executing, the framers did
not include any procedures for a taxpayer to establish its rights to the exemption, and,
therefore, the Texas Legislature is free to prescribe such rules. See id. at 902.
173. See id. at 903. As the court noted, in the absence of a deadline, the exemption
determination process could go on indefinitely, which would clearly frustrate the purpose
of the exemption and the administration of the Tax Code.
174. 962 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. granted) (This case was re-
versed in part after the Survey period. See 1999 Tex. LEXIS 34 (Tex. 1999)).
175. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.43(i) & 25.21 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
176. See id. § 11.43(i) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the appraisal district and
the hospital, concluding that the only relief the school districts were enti-
tled to was denial of the exemption for the current year, and that retroac-
tive relief was barred by limitations and lack of standing.178 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court.179 The court of
appeals considered section 41.04,180 which provides that a taxing unit can-
not challenge an action by the appraisal district unless the challenge is
initiated before June 1 or within fifteen days after the date the appraisal
records are submitted to the appraisal review board, whichever is later.181
Given that section 41.04 limits the time taxing units may act to challenge
an appraisal district action, and that sections 11.43(i) and 25.21 appear to
be within the exclusive province of the chief appraiser, the court reasoned
that retroactive relief is not available to the school districts. The court
also concluded that nothing had been "discovered," since the exemptions
were originally granted which would warrant revoking the exemption ret-
roactively.182 There was no evidence that the status of the hospital's
property was unknown to or overlooked by the chief appraiser. 183
The Texas Supreme Court in Clint Independent School District v. Cash
Investments, Inc.,184 considered a challenge to a purchase at a tax foreclo-
sure sale. In this case, the delinquent tax judgment was almost $67,000
and the market value of the property as determined by the court was
approximately $1.1 million. At the foreclosure sale, a third-party
purchased the property for $360, the highest bid. The taxing unit chal-
lenged the sale based on section 33.50(b) of the Tax Code, 185 which pro-
vides that the property "may not be sold to the property owner or to any
party to the suit, other than a taxing unit, for less than its market value or
the delinquent taxes, whichever is less."1 86 Although the literal wording
of section 33.50(b) does not apply to a purchaser that is not the property
owner or a taxing unit, and thereby does not literally place a limit on
what the bid and sales price can be as to such third-party purchasers, the
court relied on legislative history in concluding that section 33.50(b)
should be read to limit the amount for which a third party may purchase a
177. See id. § 25.21 (Vernon 1992).
178. See 962 S.W.2d at 189.
179. See id. at 192.
180. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.04 (Vernon 1992).
181. See id.
182. See 962 S.W.2d at 191.
183. The court also concluded that it was not error for the lower court to consider a
letter from the Comptroller's office that addressed the statutory interpretation issues at
hand. See id. at 192. The Court noted that such letters are not binding, but can be consid-
ered seriously by a court. Query whether the court's statement that such letters can be
seriously by a court may spur appraisal districts and other taxing entities to lobby the
Comptroller's office to write letters to courts supporting the taxing units' position, and
query whether such letters should be considered by the court.
184. 970 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1998).




property at a tax foreclosure sale. 187 The phrase "to the suit" was added
in 1979 to section 33.50(b) when the tax provisions were codified. Before
this, the provision clearly prevented all purchasers from purchasing for
less than the lesser of market value or the delinquent taxes. Because
there was no mention in the legislative history of section 33.50(b) that it
was being amended to allow third parties to purchase for less than market
value or delinquent taxes, the court concluded that the legislature did not
intend to make substantive changes when it recodified section
33.50(b). 188 In addition, the court concluded that interpreting section
33.50(b) to allow for purchases below fair market value or delinquent
taxes would be inconsistent with section 34.01(c), 189 which provides that
if a sufficient bid is not received, the property shall be bid off to a taxing
unit that is a party to the judgment for the aggregate delinquent taxes or
the property's market value, whichever is less. The court reasoned that a
"sufficient bid" must be a minimum bid under section 33.50(b), and if
section 33.50(b) did not have a minimum bid requirement for third par-
ties, section 34.01(c) would be a nullity.190
The decisions in G.E. American Communication v. Galveston Central
Appraisal District'91 and GE Capital Corp. v. Dallas Central Appraisal
District'92 demonstrate a split concerning the standard of review of ap-
peals made under section 25.25 of the Tax Code. 193 Section 25.25(C) 194
provides that at any time before the end of five years after January 1 of a
tax year, the appraisal review board, on motion of either the appraisal
district or a property owner, may direct changes in the tax roll to correct
certain clerical errors, multiple appraisals of a property in the same year,
and the inclusion of property on the tax roll that does not exist in the
form or at the location described in the tax roll. 195 Section 25.25(g) 196
provides that a property owner or the appraisal district may sue to com-
pel the appraisal review board to order a change in the appraisal roll. 197
In G.E. American, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals reversed
its 1995 decision in Harris County Appraisal District v. World Houston,
Inc.,' 98 and concluded that an appeal under section 25.25(g) requires a
substantive review of the proceedings rather than merely the review of
whether procedural due process occurred at the appraisal review board
187. See 970 S.W.2d at 538-39.
188. See id. at 539.
189. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01(a) (Vernon 1992).
190. See 970 S.W.2d at 539. This interpretation seems to be a stretch. Section 34.01(c)
would not be a nullity if it did not apply to third party purchases because the section would
still be applicable to purchases by the property owner or a taxing unit.
191. 979 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
192. 971 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App-Dallas 1998, no pet.).
193. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
194. Id. § 25.25(c) (Vernon 1982).
195. See id.
196. Id. § 25.25(g).
197. See id.
198. 905 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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level.199 The court changed its mind because of a 1997 amendment to
section 42.01,200 which provides that determinations of an appraisal re-
view board under section 25.25 are appeals.20 1 Although this amendment
was not effective for the year at issue, the court concluded that the use of
the term "appeal" in the amendment is evidence that the legislature in-
tended section 25.25(g) to serve as an appeal in the traditional sense and
not merely a review process to determine whether procedural require-
ments have been met. The court concluded, however, that a pure de
novo review is not the appropriate standard in a section 25.25(g) appeal.
Rather, the court held that the proper standard of review, prior to the
amendment to section 42.01, was substantial evidence de novo, which
gives a level of deference to the appraisal review board's decision while
still allowing an unbiased party to review the decision.20 2 The Dallas
Court of Appeals in GE Capital Corp., however, concluded that trial de
novo is the appropriate standard, even before the 1997 section 42.01
amendments, without considering whether the substantial evidence de
novo standard should apply. 20 3
IV. PROCEDURE AND LIABILITY
The court of appeals recently addressed a statute of limitations issue
relating to refunds sought following the case of Bullock v. Sage Energy
Co.,20 4 in which the court held that the comptroller's method of deter-
mining franchise tax liability was unconstitutional. The taxpayer in Over-
head Door Corp. v. Sharp,20 5 had requested a refund of franchise taxes
paid in the years 1986 and 1987. The comptroller issued a refund check to
the taxpayer in the amount requested by the taxpayer, less forty-six per-
cent to account for federal income taxes. Several years later the taxpayer
requested a refund of the additional forty-six percent. The comptroller
refunded the additional amount for the 1987, year but determined that
the 1986 year claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The taxpayer
argued that the four-year limitations period was tolled by its original re-
fund request and that the comptroller's issuance of a refund check did not
stop the tolling.
The court held that the comptroller's issuance of a refund check and
the taxpayer's acceptance of the check without reservation constituted
the comptroller's informal decision on the initial refund claim and the
limitations period had again begun to run.20 6 This analysis was not af-
fected by the fact that the refund check was issued for less than the
amount requested. The taxpayer also alleged a constitutional violation of
199. See 979 S.W.2d at 774.
200. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
201. See 979 S.W.2d at 773-75.
202. See id.
203. See 971 S.W.2d at 594.
204. 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
205. 970 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App. -Austin 1998, no pet.).
206. See id. at 79.
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the right to fair and equal taxation based on the comptroller's settlement
of a similar case. However, the court found no constitutional violation,
and held that the attorney general has broad discretion in settling cases,
and that the decision not to settle this particular case was not an abuse of
discretion. 207
The court of appeals also reviewed the statute of limitations applicable
to taxpayers seeking a refund of sales and use tax based on vendor assign-
ments. The court held in Fleming Foods v. Sharp208 that refund claims
may be barred by the statute of limitations if the comptroller and the
vendors have not entered into a waiver of the statute. The taxpayer in
Fleming Foods and the comptroller had entered into an agreement ex-
tending the time period for the taxpayer to file tax refund claims. The
comptroller denied the refunds that were outside the original limitations
period, reasoning that the original statute of limitations could not be ex-
tended without a waiver agreement between the comptroller and the ven-
dors.209 The Texas Supreme Court, which originally denied Fleming
Foods' Petition for Review, granted its Petition in September 1998, but
has not issued a decision by the time this survey article went to press.
In Formosa Plastics v. Sharp,2 10 the taxpayer paid the estimated tax
liability following its receipt of a bill for the deficiency assessment. Be-
cause the payment exceeded the audit assessment, no formal Notice of
Tax was issued, although the comptroller sent the taxpayer an audit re-
port that stated the audit assessment and acknowledged receipt of the
payment. More than four years later, Formosa claimed a refund.
Although part of the refund was granted, the comptroller denied a por-
tion of the refund claim based on his conclusion that the statute of limita-
tions had run. The district court ruled against Formosa Plastics, and the
appeals court affirmed the lower court's judgment. 211
In Stoker Management, Inc. v. Sharp,212 a janitorial services franchisor
was held liable for sales tax on services performed by its franchisees.
Generally, the franchisor collected payments, including sales taxes, from
the franchisee's customers. Upon receipt, the franchisor took its royalty
payment from the amount received and sent the remainder, including
sales tax, to the franchisee. In determining that the franchisor was liable
for remitting taxes to the state, the court held that the franchisor is not
required to be a seller or retailer for the trust fund provisions of sec-
tion 111.016213 to apply. 214 Despite this holding, the court further found
207. See id. at 80.
208. 951 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted). See generally Ohlenforst,
1998 Annual Survey, supra note 2.
209. See Ohlenforst, 1998 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 1379, for a more complete
discussion of this case.
210. 979 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
211. Id. This is one of several 1998 cases in which the court of appeals has declined to
hear oral arguments, notwithstanding a party's request for oral argument.
212. 958 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1997, pet. denied).
213. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
214. See 958 S.W.2d at 289.
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that based on the franchisor's activities, the franchisor was a seller under
the statute.
Decision 37,260215 is one of several penalty cases issued during the last
year. Although unremarkable in its facts, the case is worth discussion
because it focuses on the comptroller's view that once an auditor has indi-
cated to a taxpayer that its tax treatment is incorrect and explained the
comptroller's view of how the taxes should be reported, "then the tax-
payer must report that way, or, face imposition of a penalty if it does not,
unless it is vindicated in its choice. ' 21 6 In upholding this position and
concluding that a taxpayer must report its taxes in accordance with an
audit until vindicated, the comptroller essentially requires a taxpayer to
choose between a penalty (if the comptroller's position is ultimately up-
held) or making an interest-free loan to the state (if the taxpayer's posi-
tion is ultimately upheld). Given the fact that Texas does not pay interest
on tax refunds granted pursuant to administrative hearings, requiring the
taxpayer to make this Hobson's Choice seems inequitable.
More often than not, taxpayers who challenge penalties appear to be
losing their cases. Even when taxpayers win in the beginning, they may
lose in the end. In Decision 35,445,217 for example, the comptroller's pro-
posed decision concluded that the taxpayer was subject to the ten percent
"regular penalty," but not to the fifty percent penalty under sec-
tion 111.061(b). 218 This case involved a taxpayer who failed to "do the
right thing" (because it collected and failed to remit taxes), then tried to
do the right thing (by notifying the comptroller of its error in connection
with the comptroller's audit of a related company); nonetheless, the tax-
payer ultimately lost and was required to pay the fifty percent penalty.
Although the taxpayer apparently did not intend to retain permanently
the taxes it had collected from Texas customers, and apparently did in-
tend to pay them once it could determine more accurately how much
money had been remitted and paid, the (bad) fact remained that the tax-
payer had collected and failed to remit taxes.219
Decision 36,229220 reiterates the comptroller's view that a motion to
dismiss a petition for redetermination serves as no precedential value and
is essentially "not authority for anything. ' 221 To the extent the comptrol-
ler's office continues to follow this policy, it may force taxpayers to insist
on a hearing decision that recites the agreement of the parties rather than
dismissing the petition on the basis of a motion to dismiss.
215. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,260 (July 15, 1998).
216. Id.
217. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,445 (July 8, 1998).
218. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
219. The taxpayer had relied on a third party billing company to collect tax from its
Texas customers, but the billing company's records did not provide the taxpayer with suffi-
cient data to determine the precise amount of tax to be paid to each locality.
220. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,229 (Sept. 4, 1998).
221. Id.
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